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1 Introduction 
Beginning with Blackwell and Dubins (1962) and Aumann (1976) economists have focused on 
circumstances that make disagreement difficult in a rational setting. Aumann (1976) shows if 
agents share a common prior and have common knowledge of each other’s posterior beliefs, they 
cannot agree to disagree. More recent work, however, shows that disagreement can arise even 
when agents have common priors and observe the same time series of public information. 
Acemoglu et al. (2006) argue, there are many empirical scenarios where permanent disagreement 
arises. In fact Acemoglu et al. (2006) demonstrate that agreement may be impossible, despite the 
fact that all agents update their beliefs as Bayesians. 
Several empirical papers in finance have studied the effect of disagreement among investors on 
asset prices. There are three primary hypotheses associated with this stream of research. The 
first, to which we refer hereafter as the “information asymmetry hypothesis,” posits that high 
levels of investor disagreement regarding a stock imply a high level of information asymmetry. 
This in turn suggests an initial discounting of a stock’s price, i.e., low initial returns, followed by 
high subsequent returns to compensate for its high level of risk (see Williams 1977; Varian 1985; 
Merton 1987; Kraus and Smith 1989; Wang 1993; Harris and Raviv 1993; He and Wang 1995; 
Naik 1997). 
The second hypothesis, which was originally developed by Miller (1977), posits that high levels 
of disagreement lead to “optimistic prices” when there exist restrictions against short-selling.1 
Because only the pessimistic investors are restricted from participating in the market for that 
stock, the stock’s price will therefore reflect the opinion of the more optimistic investors. 
We designate this the “sidelined investor hypothesis.” Morris (1996), Chen et al. (2002), and 
Viswanathan (2002) offer alternative explanations for optimistic investors’ participation in stock 
markets. Naturally, the greater the level of shorting constraints or the greater the level of 
disagreement, the more upwardly biased the price and hence the initial return will be. When this 
overvaluation reverses, we will observe negative abnormal returns for the stock. Thus, the first 
two hypotheses come to opposite conclusions; the first suggests low initial and high subsequent 
returns, while the second suggests high initial and low subsequent returns. 
It is quite plausible that the aforementioned competing hypotheses may be at play simultaneously 
in the market, neutralizing the effect of each other or through another mechanism that results in 
unbiased prices. In fact, there is a third hypothesis, which has not received as much attention in 
the empirical asset pricing literature, which leads to similar conclusions albeit employing 
different arguments. This hypothesis is attributed to Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) and Hong 
and Stein (2003). The central prediction of their models is that prices remain unbiased despite the 
presence of disagreement among investors. Consequently, future abnormal returns will, on 
average, be close to zero. These models rely on the existence of influential rational agents. While 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) require a perfectly rational market maker with unlimited 
computational abilities and access to all public information, Hong and Stein (2003) depend on 
the presence of perfectly rational arbitrageurs to eliminate any mispricing. We refer to this 
hypothesis hereafter as the “unbiased prices hypothesis.” 
Unfortunately, disagreement among investors is not directly observable. Therefore, researchers 
have used various proxies to investigate the influence of heterogeneous beliefs on asset prices 
and future returns and not surprisingly have arrived at conflicting conclusions. Diether et al. 
(2002) use dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts as a proxy and find that the dispersion of 
opinion relates negatively to future returns. Park (2005) extends this work by testing whether the 
aggregate stock market becomes overpriced when differences in expectations are high. Park 
(2005) find that the dispersion in expectations among market analysts has predictive power for 
future stock returns: higher dispersion predicts lower stock returns. Cheng and Huang (2015) 
find similar results for Taiwan stock markets for 1990 to 2008. Yu (2011) finds that the ex post 
market return is negatively related to the bottom-up disagreement amongst analysts. Liu and 
Seasholes (2011) examine dual-listed shares in China and Hong Kong and show that when there 
is a short-sale ban in China, the prices of Chinese stocks are 1.8 times higher compared to those 
in Hong Kong. Similarly Chen et al. (2002) find compelling support for the Miller hypothesis in 
several markets in which there are binding short-sale constraints. However, Boehme et al. (2009) 
and Avramov et al. (2009) find evidence to the contrary. Goetzmann and Massa (2005) examine 
trading data from investor accounts to construct their measure of disagreement and find that 
disagreement relates positively to contemporaneous returns and negatively to future returns. 
Their findings also suggest that over-optimism, and not additional risk factors, is the dominant 
force driving returns. Hu et al. (2007) also find that disagreement among buy-side managers 
precedes low returns, especially for stocks that have constraints on short-selling. In summary, 
these studies employing different measures of investor disagreement find evidence corroborating 
Miller’s (1977) sidelined investor hypothesis. 
Doukas et al. (2006) use a measure free of the confounding effects of analysts’ forecasts and find 
that future stock returns are positively associated with divergence of opinion, which is consistent 
with the information asymmetry hypothesis. The information asymmetry hypothesis is also 
supported by Garfinkel and Sokobin (2006), who find that the divergence of opinion, as 
measured by unexpected trading volume, is positively related to post-earnings announcement 
drift in stock returns. The authors thus conclude that divergence of opinion constitutes a priced 
risk factor. Similarly, Cragg and Malkiel (1982) report a positive relation between dispersion in 
analysts’ forecasts and future returns for a sample of firms between 1961 and 1969. However, 
the studies that use analysts’ forecasts to proxy disagreement suffer from another problem. 
Recent papers by Anderson et al. (2005), Cao et al. (2005), Ali et al. (2009), Johnson (2004) and 
Qu et al. (2004) contend that the relationship between analysts’ forecast dispersion and future 
returns can be explained by factors other than divergence in opinion and optimistic valuation. In 
summary, the various measures of the heterogeneity of beliefs lead to conflicting results 
depending on the measure employed. Hence, the collective weight of the empirical evidence has 
to date left the issue unresolved. 
This paper proposes a new measure of disagreement to examine the implications of divergence 
of opinion on asset prices. Our new measure captures the level of disagreement in a stock in a 
quarter as the absolute value of the difference between the number of institutional investors 
buying and the number of institutional investors selling, scaled by the total number of 
institutional investors trading the stock. If disagreement is high then we expect the number of 
institutional investors buying and selling the stocks to be almost equal. Thus, low values of this 
measure (“institutional ratio”) imply a high level of disagreement among institutional investors. 
In a recent article, Garfinkel (2009) also proposes a new proxy constructed from proprietary data 
to capture difference of opinion among investors. We not only provide a new measure that uses 
publicly available information, but also apply it to the much larger database and obtain new 
results for the impact of heterogeneous beliefs on asset prices. 
There are at least two advantages of our measure over the proxies being used to capture 
disagreement among investors or divergence of opinion in the literature. First, since our measure 
focuses on the actual buying and selling behavior of institutions, we capture disagreement in a 
natural and explicit way. Unlike the different ways in which investors interpret a firm’s earnings 
forecasts, or instances of abnormal trading that may be due to reasons other than difference of 
opinion, the basic divergence with respect to buying and selling a stock in a particular time 
period is an obvious and unambiguous sign of disagreement. Second, to improve the power of 
the empirical tests, it may be more appropriate to use measures that have been shown in the 
literature to meaningfully influence asset prices, such as institutional trading (see Gompers and 
Metrick 2001; Nofsinger and Sias 1999; Yan and Zhang 2009). Our measure has this advantage 
as well. 
Our paper contains several unique findings. First, the level of agreement for different stocks 
varies widely within the buy-side of the market. Additionally, there are several factors that are 
associated with the level of disagreement. A high level of disagreement is associated with stocks 
with high (relative) abnormal turnover, market capitalization, institutional trading and 
ownership, as well as stocks with low sales growth, price volatility, book-to-market ratios, and, 
interestingly, a low dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts and greater analyst coverage. 
Our main findings are as follows. Within the sample of high-disagreement stocks, there is a 
positive and significant average contemporaneous quarterly abnormal return, which is predicted 
by the sidelined investor hypothesis. However, this is followed by another positive average 
abnormal return in the subsequent month; thus, we fail to detect the reversal predicted by the 
sidelined investor hypothesis. Additionally, the positive abnormal return contemporaneous to the 
quarter of disagreement is not significantly higher for high-disagreement stocks than it is for 
low-disagreement stocks, signifying a further lack of evidence for the sidelined investor 
hypothesis. Thus, our first set of results appears inconsistent with the information asymmetry and 
sidelined investor hypotheses. 
Although it initially appears that our results give qualified support to the unbiased prices 
hypothesis of Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) and Hong and Stein (2003), further analysis is 
required. Because the information asymmetry and sidelined investor hypotheses make opposite 
predictions for stock returns, it is possible that both have merit and that the two opposing forces 
are simply canceling one another out. This seems especially plausible for stocks that exhibit a 
high degree of both shorting constraints and information asymmetry, which is often the case, i.e., 
the intersection of these two groups is likely to be a high percentage of their union. For example, 
small stocks that suffer a great degree of information asymmetry are also subject to a high level 
of shorting constraints. In order to test these two competing hypotheses against the unbiased 
prices hypothesis, we conduct three additional rounds of analysis. First, we sort the subsample of 
high-disagreement stocks by each of the three proxies for information asymmetry: firm size, 
book-to-market ratio and the dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts, respectively, and 
compare the contemporaneous and subsequent returns to each subsample based on the level of 
information asymmetry. Second, we perform a similar comparison on the basis of short-selling 
constraints, alternately using institutional holdings and idiosyncratic volatility as proxies. Third, 
we conduct double-sorts based on both firm size and shorting constraints to further examine the 
interplay among the three hypotheses as well as their individual importance. While the one-way 
sorting indicates some support for the information asymmetry hypothesis and no support for the 
sidelined investor hypothesis, the two-way sorting procedure offers considerable evidence of 
both. Thus it appears that to an extent the two hypotheses are supported by the data but tend to 
cancel one another out for many of the stocks in our sample, therefore initially giving the third 
hypothesis (unbiased prices) the appearance of empirical support. 
2 Sample data, measure of disagreement, and methodology 
2.1 Sample data 
We use the stock-holdings data of institutional investors to construct our sample of stocks about 
which investors hold divergent opinions. A 1978 amendment to the Securities and Exchange Act 
of 1934 requires all institutions managing more than $100 million of securities to report their 
holdings to the SEC. The holdings are reported on form 13-F on a quarterly basis for all 
exchange-traded or NASDAQ-quoted equity securities within 45 days of the end of each quarter. 
These institutions are required to report any equity position greater than either 10,000 shares or 
$200,000 in market value. These requirements set out the conditions for mandatory reporting of 
holdings. However, some institutions voluntarily report their holdings of all stocks. Interestingly, 
the dataset also includes hedge funds as long as they meet the requirements listed above. We use 
Thomson Financial 13-F data to obtain the quarterly stock holdings of all institutions between 
the fourth quarter of 1980 and the second quarter of 2010. 
We extract stock returns data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP, hereafter) 
monthly files. We exclude ADRs (American Depositary Receipts), SBIs (Shares of Beneficial 
Interest), Units (Depository Units, Units of Beneficial Interest, Units of Limited Partnership 
Interest, Depository Receipts, etc.), REITs (Real Estate Investment Trusts), and closed-end funds 
from our sample. Thus our final sample consists of common stocks within the intersection of the 
CRSP monthly files and institutional investors’ holdings databases from the fourth quarter of 
1980 to the second quarter of 2010, i.e. 122 quarters. Our analysis is based on 564,214 stock-
quarters for which we have information on all relevant variables. Thus in an average quarter we 
have 4625 stocks that were traded by institutions. 
2.2 Measure of disagreement 
We base our measure of the level of disagreement among investors on institutional investors’ holdings 
data. Our measure focuses on the disagreement in trading among institutional investors for a stock in a 
quarter. To proxy for the degree of disagreement among institutional investors, we construct the 
following metric: 
I(i,t)=|NB(i,t)−NS(i,t)|NB(i,t)+NS(i,t) 
(1) 
We designate this the institutional ratio. Here, NB(i, t) is the number of institutional investors 
who buy stock i in quarter t. NS (i, t) is the number of institutional investors who sell stock i in 
quarter t. Therefore the numerator in the institutional ratio, I(i,t), reflects the absolute value of 
excess of buyers over sellers of stock i in quarter t.2 The denominator is simply the total number 
of institutional investors who traded stock i in quarter t. Since it takes at least two investors to 
disagree, we compute this measure for only those stock-quarters that had two or more 
institutional traders. If all institutional investors end up buying or selling stock i in quarter t, then 
I(i,t) would equal 1, which is indicative of a high degree of agreement with respect to the stock’s 
prospects. On the other hand, if there is an equal number of buyers and sellers for stock i in 
quarter t, then I(i,t) would be 0. It is reasonable to assume that this signifies a high level of 
disagreement among institutional investors. Therefore I(i,t) may range from 0 to 1 and lower 
values of I(i,t) are consistent with a greater degree of disagreement. 
Since institutional investors do not buy or sell a stock due to informational reasons only, we employ 
several adjustments to ensure that our measure of disagreement, I(i,t), is not contaminated by other 
motives for institutional trading. The adjustments control for possible impacts on the institutional ratio 
that could be due to the return on the existing holding of stock i and the net flow of funds to the 
institutional investor during the current quarter, t. In the first step we use the following formula, which 
is inspired by Barber et al. (2005), and Griffin et al. (2011), to determine whether for each stock i in 
quarter t an institutional investor K is a buyer (Inst(i,t) is positive) or a seller (Inst(i,t) is negative). 
Inst(i,t)=Si,tPi,t−Si,t−1Pi,t−1(1+ri)Si,t−1Pi,t−1−∑i=mi=1Si,tPi,t−∑i=mi=1Si,tPi,t−1(1+ri)∑i=mi=1Si,t−
1Pi,t−1 
(2) 
In this expression, Si,t and Si,t−1 represent the number of shares held by a particular institutional investor 
K in stock i at the end of quarter t and t − 1, respectively. Pi,t and Pi,t-1 are the share price of stock i at the 
end of quarter t and t-1, respectively. The return for stock i in the current quarter t is captured by ri. 
Therefore, the first term in Eq. (2) computes the net buying or selling of stock i in quarter t by 
institutional investor K as a fraction of its initial holding of the stock, adjusted for the return on stock i in 
the current quarter. The second term computes the net buying or selling by the same institutional 
investor K across all m stocks traded in quarter t. If institutional investor K faces an inflow (outflow) of 
funds in quarter t, we expect the second term to be positive (negative). Therefore Inst(i,t) measures the 
level of buying or selling of stock i in quarter t that is over and above the net inflow or outflow of funds 
to institutional investor K, adjusted for stock return. In addition, we adjust the shareholdings and prices 
for stock-splits and stock dividends in our computation. It is worth noting that we concentrate on 
whether an institution is a net buyer or seller of a stock rather than the number or dollar amount of 
shares traded by the institutional investor. We believe that for the purposes of capturing disagreement 
among institutional investors, whether an institution buys or sells a stock is more important than the 
dollar amount or the number of shares it trades.3  
We denote BK(i,t) and SK(i,t) as the respective count for institutional buyers and sellers of stock i in 
quarter t, and assign a value of 1 to BK(i,t) and 0 to SK(i,t) if the value of Inst(i,t) in Eq. (2) is positive. 
Similarly we assign a value of 1 to SK(i,t) and 0 to BK(i,t) if the value of Inst(i,t) is negative. We compute 
this measure for each stock i traded by each institution in quarter t. Therefore, NB(i, t) and NS (i,t) in 
Eq. (1) are computed as follows: 
NB(i,t)=∑K=1K=NBK(i,t) 
(3) 
and 
NS(i,t)=∑K=1K=NSK(i,t) 
(4) 
where N denotes the total number of institutions trading stock i in quarter t. 
Furthermore, we use the following filters to ensure that our results based on the institutional 
ratio, I(i,t) in Eq. (1), are unaffected by issues other than the difference in opinion arising out of 
information. As a new stock comes to the market via an IPO in a quarter, most institutions will 
be net buyers and hence I(i,t) will be inflated. To alleviate this problem, we compute I(i,t) for 
only those stocks that existed in the previous quarter, t-1. Similarly, I(i,t) will be deflated for 
those quarters when stocks go out of existence due to merger, acquisition, delisting, etc. To 
correct for this potential bias, we exclude the quarter when a stock exited the sample from the 
computation of I(i,t). 
Similar to IPOs, seasoned equity offerings may also affect the institutional ratio. As a proxy for 
seasoned equity offerings, we assume that if the number of shares outstanding (adjusted for 
stock-splits, stock dividends, etc.) for a stock has increased by more than 25 % from the previous 
quarter, then the stock has had a potential seasoned equity offering in the current quarter.4 We 
remove such stock-quarters from our final sample. 
Since the performance of many institutions is benchmarked against stock market indexes, part of 
the institutional trading in stocks may be explained by indexing. To eliminate the effect of 
indexing on our results, we remove all stock-quarters that were affected by additions and 
deletions to the S&P 500 during the sample period. In order to do this, we downloaded a file 
from Professor Jeffrey Wurgler’s website, which contains all additions and deletions to the S&P 
500 index. This file contains the company identifier, addition or deletion flag, announcement 
date and effective date for addition to (or deletion from) the index, among other variables. If the 
level of trading in a stock is related to its addition to (or deletion from) the S&P 500, we expect 
most of it to occur around the quarter of addition to (or deletion from) the index. We determine 
the quarter and year of addition or deletion for all stocks in this sample using the effective date 
and then merge it with our sample of stocks. We exclude from our final sample all stock-quarters 
in which additions or deletions occurred. 
2.3 Methodology 
Following the institutional investor literature, we adopt the methodology of Wermers (1999) to 
gauge the degree of disagreement on stock prices. In the spirit of Fama and MacBeth (1973), we 
examine quarterly cross-sectional contemporaneous abnormal returns and the subsequent 
months’ average abnormal returns of the stocks for which investors hold different opinions. One 
may reason that much of the reversal following the quarter of disagreement (denoted Qtr 0) will 
occur immediately afterwards. We capture this reversal by reporting the monthly abnormal 
returns for each of the 3 months (denoted M + 1, M + 2, and M + 3) in the subsequent quarter 
(denoted Qtr 1). We expect the reversal to be the greatest in the first month, i.e., M + 1. 
If the “information asymmetry hypothesis’ describes the effect of disagreement on stock prices, 
then we expect stocks with a higher (lower) degree of disagreement in the current quarter to have 
not only lower (higher) abnormal returns contemporaneously, but also higher (lower) abnormal 
returns in the subsequent quarter. By contrast, the “sidelined investor hypothesis” predicts that 
stocks with a higher (lower) degree of disagreement in the current quarter will have not only 
higher (lower) abnormal returns contemporaneously, but also lower (higher) abnormal returns in 
the subsequent quarter. Last, the “unbiased prices hypothesis” postulates that disagreement has 
no impact on stock prices. Hence, we do not expect any relationship between abnormal returns in 
the contemporaneous quarter and subsequent abnormal returns conditioned on the difference of 
opinion. Any abnormal returns observed merely represent the incorporation of new information 
into prices via the trading of institutional investors. 
In order to compute quarterly abnormal returns, we first compute monthly abnormal returns using the 
Fama–French (1993) model augmented with the momentum factor introduced by Carhart (1997). We 
download the factors from Kenneth French’s website. To compute the abnormal return of each stock i, 
we regress the stock’s monthly excess return on the three factors of Fama and French (1993) and the 
momentum factor in Carhart (1997) as follows: ri,t − rf,t = αi + βi (rm,t − rf,t) + γi (smbt) + δi (hmlt) + ωi 
(momt) + εi,t. In particular, ri,t − rf,t is the excess return of stock i over the 1-month T-bill yield, which 
proxies for the risk-free rate in month t; the first factor, rm,t − rf,t, denotes the excess return of the value-
weighted return on all NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks over the 1-month T-bill yield in month t; the 
second factor, smbt, is the difference between the respective returns of small and large capitalization 
stocks in month t; the third factor, hmlt, is the difference between the respective returns of high and low 
book-to-market stocks in month t; and the fourth factor, momt, is the difference between the respective 
returns of stocks with high and low recent returns in month t. The asset-pricing factor models state that 
αi = 0, and εi,t is orthogonal to information known in month t-1. T The abnormal return for stock i in 
month t is given by this formula: 
ARi,t≡ri,t−rf,t−β^i(rm,t−rf,t)−γ^i(smbt)−δ^i(hmlt)−ω^i(momt)=α^i+ε^i,t. 
To compute the abnormal return in a quarter, we compound the 3 monthly abnormal returns for stock i 
for that quarter. 
2.4 Descriptive statistics 
Although not tabulated here, we find that the time-series mean (median) of the quarterly cross-
sectional average of the institutional ratio is 0.244 (0.217), ranging from a high of 0.923 to a low 
of 0.140. When we sort the sample into three groups based on market capitalization every 
quarter, we observe an inverse relationship between the institutional ratio and firm size, 
averaging 0.331 for the smallest stocks and decreasing monotonically to 0.159 for the largest 
stocks. This is consistent with the idea that investors have a greater divergence of opinion for 
larger stocks. Similarly, when we sort the stocks based on institutional holdings, we observe that 
the mean institutional ratio is 0.190 for the group of stocks with the highest level of institutional 
holdings and 0.308 for those with the lowest level of institutional holdings. This implies that 
investors have a higher divergence of opinion for stocks with low shorting constraints, to the 
extent that institutional holdings proxy for shorting constraints. 
Table 1 offers a comparison between stocks about which there is a high level of disagreement and those 
that experience a low level of disagreement. The variables selected for each stock are its return volatility 
over the previous 12 months, the dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts, abnormal trading volume 
over the previous four quarters, market capitalization, price-to-earnings ratio, book-to-market ratio, the 
number of institutional trades, the percentage of shares outstanding that is held by institutions, the 
number of analysts covering the stock, past returns, and growth in sales over the past year. We provide 
further details regarding the computation of these variables in Table 1. Figures in boldface signify a 
difference between high- and low-disagreement stocks that is statistically significant at the 1 % level. 
Table 1  
Stock characteristics and the degree of disagreement 
Stock variable 
Disagreement among institutions 
High disagreement Low disagreement 
Volatility 12.410***  15.420***  
Dispersion 0.083***  0.430***  
Stock turnover 0.016  -0.013  
Size 12.562**  10.818***  
P/E ratio 36.109*** 37.529*** 
Book-to market ratio 0.716***  1.052***  
Number of Institutional trades 92.495***  26.778***  
Institutional holdings 42.000***  21.027***  
Analyst coverage 8.846***  3.648***  
Past returns 0.082*** 0.072*** 
Sales growth 1.772***  2.622***  
This table shows variable means for high and low levels of disagreement between institutional 
investors. The degree of disagreement among institutional investors is captured by the 
“institutional ratio”, which is computed for each stock in each quarter traded by institutions as 
detailed in the text. Volatility is the standard deviation of a stock’s past 12 months of monthly 
returns. Dispersion is the standard deviation of analysts’ earnings forecasts scaled by the closing 
stock price on the trading day preceding the forecast date. The standard deviation of the forecasts 
is based on the IBES Summary Historical files. Stock turnover is the mean excess turnover of a 
stock computed from the past 4 quarters of exchange-adjusted quarterly turnover. Size is the 
natural logarithm of market capitalization, which is the market price multiplied by shares 
outstanding extracted from the CRSP monthly files. To compute P/E ratio, price is taken at the 
end of the month from the CRSP files and earnings is extracted from the annual COMPUSTAT 
files (data item #233). We use the most recent earnings if the firm’s fiscal year is within 90 days 
of the current month—otherwise we use the prior year’s earnings and end-of fiscal year price per 
share. Book-to-Market ratio is the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity. Book 
Value is taken from the COMPUSTAT annual files and market value is market price multiplied 
by shares outstanding extracted from the CRSP monthly files. Institutional holding is the fraction 
of equity held by institutional investors in a particular quarter. Analyst coverage is the number of 
valid estimates used to compute the mean earnings forecast and is extracted from the IBES 
Historical Summary files. Past return is the preceding 6 months’ abnormal returns based on the 
Carhart 4-factor model. We compound monthly abnormal returns to compute the 6 month return. 
Sales growth is the average sales growth of the firms in the analyst portfolios. To compute sales 
growth, we divide the current fiscal year’s sales with the previous fiscal year’s sales. Sales are 
extracted from the COMPUSTAT annual files (data item #12). Similar to the P/E ratio, we use 
the most current sales growth if the firm’s financial year ends within 90 days of the current 
month; otherwise we use the prior year’s sales growth. We compute the cross-sectional mean of 
each variable for each group of stocks in each quarter and then take the time-series average for 
the entire time-period. ***, **, and * signify statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % level 
respectively. The variables whose difference in means between high and low disagreement are 
statistically different have values listed in bold 
Our results show that among institutions, disagreement is concentrated in stocks with relatively 
low sales growth, price volatility, and book-to-market ratios, as well as stocks with high market 
capitalization, analyst coverage, institutional holdings, and trading. Interestingly, stocks with a 
lower dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts and high abnormal turnover tend to experience a 
higher degree of disagreement among institutions. It is noteworthy that prior studies have used 
dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts and abnormal turnover as proxies of disagreement 
among investors. Thus our measure captures a new dimension of disagreement. 
3 Results 
3.1 Initial results 
Table 2 presents a time-series of the cross-sectional average of quarterly and monthly abnormal stock 
return statistics, sorted by the level of disagreement, for the stocks traded by institutions. “Qtr 0” refers 
to the quarter in which the disagreement occurred (this number is computed on a quarterly basis 
because our agreement/disagreement observations are quarterly), while “Qtr 1” refers to the abnormal 
returns of the following quarter. “M + 1”, “M + 2” and “M + 3” refer to the abnormal returns of the 
3 months in Qtr 1, respectively.5 When institutions disagree most about a stock (see the “HD” tercile), 
the contemporaneous quarterly abnormal return (0.48 %) is positive and significant, the following 
month’s return (0.29 %) is significantly positive, and the returns in the next 2 months are again positive, 
though statistically insignificant. The difference in the contemporaneous quarter abnormal returns 
between stocks in the high (HD) and low (LD) disagreement terciles is insignificant as well. Thus these 
initial results presented in Panel A are consistent with neither the “information asymmetry hypothesis” 
nor the “sidelined investor hypothesis”. Further, we conduct a robustness check by sorting our sample 
into quintiles instead of terciles. As reported in Panel B of Table 2, the results are similar to those 
reported in Panel A as highlighted in the above discussion. Since we perform double-sorting of the 
sample in subsequent analysis, we adopt tercile grouping to ensure larger sample sizes in order to 
enhance the power of the tests. 
Table 2  
Stock returns when institutions disagree 
  Institutional ratio Qtr 0 Qtr 1 M + 1 M + 2 M + 3 
Panel A: Degree of disagreement amongst institutions and stock returns  
High disagreement (HD) 
0.042 
(<0.000) 
0.480 
(0.027) 
0.324 
(0.157) 
0.286 
(0.010) 
0.035 
(0.718) 
0.071 
(0.475) 
  Institutional ratio Qtr 0 Qtr 1 M + 1 M + 2 M + 3 
Medium disagreement (MD) 
0.176 
(<0.000) 
0.229 
(0.326) 
0.417 
(0.089) 
0.361 
(0.003) 
0.022 
(0.824) 
0.018 
(0.856) 
Low disagreement (LD) 
0.506 
(<0.000) 
0.427 
(0.352) 
0.600 
(0.172) 
0.986 
(<0.000) 
0.016 
(0.928) 
−0.227 
(0.216) 
HD-LD 
−0.464 
(<0.000) 
0.053 
(0.915) 
−0.276 
(0.574) 
−0.700 
(0.007) 
0.0188 
(0.929) 
0.299 
(0.152) 
Panel B: Degree of disagreement amongst institutions and stock returns  
High disagreement (HD) 
0.019 
(<0.000) 
0.487 
(0.044) 
0.365 
(0.181) 
0.411 
(0.001) 
−0.002 
(0.982) 
0.038 
(0.747) 
MD4 
0.086 
(<0.000) 
0.427 
(0.034) 
0.234 
(0.215) 
0.131 
(0.191) 
0.046 
(0.611) 
0.096 
(0.279) 
MD3 
0.174 
(<0.000) 
0.225 
(0.330) 
0.520 
(0.056) 
0.406 
(0.001) 
0.051 
(0.610) 
0.007 
(0.944) 
MD2 
0.290 
(<0.000) 
0.009 
(0.981) 
0.457 
(0.160) 
0.663 
(0.000) 
0.023 
(0.876) 
−0.128 
(0.361) 
Low disagreement (LD) 
0.642 
(<0.000) 
0.729 
(0.169) 
0.629 
(0.216) 
1.160 
(<0.000) 
0.003 
(0.987) 
−0.274 
(0.202) 
HD-LD 
−0.623 
(<0.000) 
−0.242 
(0.676) 
−0.264 
(0.645) 
−0.705 
(0.022) 
−0.006 
(0.980) 
0.313 
(0.202) 
This table compares the contemporaneous and future returns of stocks conditioned on the degree 
of disagreement among institutional investors. The degree of disagreement among institutional 
investors is captured by institutional ratio which is computed for each stock in each quarter 
traded by institutions as detailed in the text. Qtr 0 refers to the quarter in which the 
agreement/disagreement occurred, while M + 1, M + 2 and M + 3 refer to the abnormal returns 
of the subsequent 3 months. We compute the cross-sectional mean of the abnormal returns for 
each group of stocks in each quarter and then take the time-series average for the entire time 
period. All abnormal returns are based on the Carhart 4-factor model. To compute the monthly 
abnormal returns of the stocks, we regress excess stock returns on the excess market, size, book-
to-market, and momentum factors. We download excess market return, size, book-to-market, and 
momentum factors from Kenneth French’s website. The abnormal return (in  %) in each month is 
the sum of the monthly residual and intercept from our regressions. P values based on two-tailed 
t tests are shown in parentheses 
3.2 Disagreement, firm size, and stock returns 
In our further examination of the information asymmetry hypothesis, we sort stocks that are subject to 
a high level of disagreement into terciles based on firm size. Firm size has been suggested as a proxy for 
information asymmetry (Frankel and Li (2004), and Wermers (1999) among others), wherein part of the 
extra risk associated with smaller firms is said to derive from a lack of publicly available information. 
Firm size is measured by the natural logarithm of market capitalization, computed as the share price at 
the start of the quarter multiplied by the number of shares outstanding extracted from the CRSP 
monthly files. Panel A of Table 3 displays the cross-sectional average of quarterly and monthly abnormal 
returns for the size-based terciles. 
Table 3  
Disagreement, firm size, and stock returns 
  Qtr 0 Qtr 1 M + 1 M + 2 M + 3 
Panel A: Abnormal return when institutions disagree sorted on firm size  
S1 (smallest firms) 
−2.222 
(<0.001) 
0.769 
(0.163) 
1.750 
(<0.001) 
−.0.14 
(0.945) 
−0.207 
(0.328) 
S2 (middle) 
1.618 
(<0.001) 
0.157 
(0.469) 
−0.095 
(0.373) 
0.007 
(0.948) 
0.253 
(0.030) 
S3 (largest firms) 
2.043 
(<0.001) 
0.045 
(0.811) 
−0.221 
(0.06) 
0.111 
(0.299) 
0.166 
(0.143) 
S1–S3 
−4.267 
(<0.001) 
0.724 
(0.105) 
1.396 
(<0.001) 
−0.126 
(0.592) 
−0.373 
(0.119) 
Panel B: Abnormal return when institutions disagree sorted on book to market ratio  
BM1 (low book-to market firms) 
4.366 
(<0.001) 
−0.084 
(0.780) 
−0.085 
(0.569) 
−.0.015 
(0.903) 
−0.044 
(0.766) 
BM2 (mid book-to market firms) 
0.899 
(<0.001) 
0.478 
(0.017) 
0.139 
(0.139) 
0.132 
(0.178) 
0.263 
(0.017) 
BM3 (high book-to market firms) 
−3.528 
(<0.001) 
1.037 
(0.005) 
0.680 
(0.000) 
0.272 
(0.065) 
0.232 
(0.080) 
BM1–BM3 
7.894 
(<0.001) 
−1.121 
(0.018) 
−0.765 
(0.001) 
−0.287 
(0.139) 
−0.276 
(0.165) 
Panel C: Abnormal return when institutions disagree sorted on analysts’ earnings forecasts 
dispersion  
  Qtr 0 Qtr 1 M + 1 M + 2 M + 3 
DISP1 (low dispersion firms) 
3.897 
(<0.001) 
1.346 
(<0.001) 
0.195 
(0.179) 
0.381 
(0.005) 
0.781 
(<0.001) 
DISP2 (mid dispersion firms) 
0.907 
(<0.001) 
0.039 
(0.850) 
−0.107 
(0.303) 
0.033 
(0.762) 
0.152 
(0.172) 
DISP3 (high dispersion firms) 
−2.978 
(<0.001) 
−0.885 
(0.005) 
−0.243 
(0.117) 
−0.196 
(0.222) 
−0.406 
(0.000) 
DISP1–DISP3 
6.875 
(<0.001) 
2.231 
(<0.001) 
0.438 
(0.038) 
0.576 
(0.006) 
1.319 
(<0.001) 
This table examines the abnormal returns, within different classes of firm size, for the case when 
investors are in disagreement. Firm size in Panel A is proxied by natural logarithm of market 
capitalization computed as the share price at the start of the quarter multiplied by the shares 
outstanding, extracted from the CRSP monthly files. In Panel B, Book-to-Market ratio is the 
ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity at the start of the quarter. Book Value is 
taken from the COMPUSTAT files and market value is market price multiplied by shares 
outstanding extracted from the CRSP monthly files. In Panel C, Dispersion is the standard 
deviation of analysts’ earnings forecasts scaled by the closing stock price on the trading day 
preceding the forecast date. The standard deviation of the forecasts is based on the IBES 
Summary Historical files. We examine the abnormal returns for the group of stocks with the 
highest level of disagreement amongst institutional investors sorted by firm size/book-market 
ratio/dispersion in analyst forecast. To identify the groups of stocks with the highest level of 
disagreement, stocks are sorted in three groups each quarter on the basis of institutional ratio as 
detailed in the text. The stocks with the lowest value of institutional ratio are categorized as the 
stocks with the highest level of disagreement among institutional investors. We compute the 
cross-sectional mean of abnormal returns for each group of stocks in each quarter and then take 
the time-series average for the entire time period. All abnormal returns are based on the Carhart 
4-factor model. Qtr 0 is the quarter in which disagreement occurs. Returns are the cumulative 
abnormal returns for the 3 months of the contemporaneous quarter 0 and the abnormal returns for 
the first 3 months afterward: M1, M2, and M3. To compute the monthly abnormal return of the 
stocks, excess stock returns are regressed on the excess market, size, book-to-market, and 
momentum factors. We download excess market return, size, book-to-market, and momentum 
factors from Kenneth French’s website. The abnormal return (in  %) in each month is the sum of 
the monthly residual and intercept from our regressions. P values based on two-tailed t tests are 
shown in parentheses 
Each group in a typical quarter has about 515 stocks. The smallest firms have negative average 
abnormal returns (−2.22 %) during the quarter of disagreement. This is consistent with the 
information asymmetry hypothesis, which posits that such firms are initially discounted most, in 
response to their greater level of riskiness. 
However, this risk-discounting argument also predicts higher returns in subsequent periods as 
compensation for higher risk. We do, in fact, witness this reversal in the subsequent month. The 
reversal following disagreement is striking; the first month’s abnormal return (1.75 %) mirrors 
roughly 80 % of the initial decline and is significant at the 0.1 % level. Moreover, the difference 
between the abnormal returns to the smallest and largest firm size terciles is also significantly 
negative in the contemporaneous quarter and positive in the following month. In addition, the 
reversal over the full quarter following disagreement can be considered marginally significant 
within the context of a one-way (predictive or “directional”) test. We interpret the findings 
reported in Table 3 as being supportive of the information asymmetry hypothesis. 
To check for the robustness of these results, we also examine the book-to-market ratio as a proxy 
for asymmetric information in Panel B. We sort the sample into terciles by the book-to-market 
ratio calculated at the beginning of each quarter. We find that in the quarter of disagreement our 
high book-to-market or “distressed” firms (tercile BM3) have an average abnormal return of 
−3.53 % and a partial but highly significant reversal of +1.04 % in the following quarter, which 
is again compatible with the information asymmetry hypothesis. In contrast, we find a 
significantly positive average abnormal return of 4.37 % in the quarter of disagreement for the 
low book-to-market or “growth” firms tercile (BM1), and an insignificant negative abnormal 
returns in the following period. However, this seems to be largely a result of a high degree of 
intersection between our low book-to-market ratio tercile of firms and our large-size tercile; low 
book-to-market ratio firms make up roughly half (48.9 %) of the large-firms tercile. Thus we 
conclude that, for the most part, the evidence is consistent with the information asymmetry 
hypothesis that investors react to the information risk associated with the quality of distressed 
firms with negative returns in the contemporaneous quarter followed by a partial reversal in the 
following quarter. 
Given the extensive intersection of the book-to-market ratio sample and the firm size sample, the 
results of the book-to-market proxy may be confounded with those of the firm size proxy. As a 
further robustness check on the supportive evidence for the information asymmetry hypothesis, 
we use the dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts as an alternate proxy for asymmetric 
information in Panel C of Table 3. We sort our sample stocks into terciles by the dispersion in 
analysts’ forecasts, which is computed as the standard deviation of analysts’ earnings forecasts 
scaled by the closing stock price on the trading day preceding the forecast date. We find a 
significant average abnormal return of −2.98 % in the quarter of disagreement for high 
information asymmetry firms that are included in the highest dispersion tercile, but a highly 
significant continuation of +0.89 % in the next quarter. In addition, we find a significantly 
positive average abnormal return of 3.90 % in the quarter of disagreement for low information 
asymmetry firms, i.e., the lowest dispersion tercile. Thus current quarter abnormal returns are 
consistent with the information asymmetry hypothesis, though we do not observe any reversal in 
subsequent quarters. Overall we can we still conclude that, for the most part, the evidence is 
consistent with the information asymmetry hypothesis, which predicts that stocks with a high 
degree of information asymmetry will experience negative abnormal returns in the quarter of 
disagreement and a partial reversal in the following quarter. 
3.3 Disagreement, short-sales constraints and stock returns 
In our further examination of the role of the sidelined investors hypothesis in explaining the 
effect of investor disagreement on asset prices, we first determine the presence of sidelined 
investors by examining changes in the level of short interest. If sidelined investors exist then we 
would expect short-sales constraints to influence stock returns. We postulate that a high volatility 
in the level of short interest implies that the sidelined investor hypothesis has a limited role in 
explaining stock returns. However, persistence in the level of short interest (i.e. a lack of 
volatility) might signify the presence of sidelined investors. We download the monthly short 
interest data for the period of 1974 to 2010 from the COMPUSTAT supplemental files. We 
divide the month-end aggregate short interest by the number of shares outstanding to compute 
the monthly short interest ratio for each stock for which there is data in COMPUSTAT. We 
make appropriate adjustments for share splits, stock dividends, etc. We estimate an AR (1) 
model by regressing the current period’s short interest ratio on the previous period’s short 
interest ratio. A lack of persistence in the short-interest ratio would imply the coefficient in the 
AR (1) model to be no different from zero. Instead, we find the coefficient to be a highly 
significant 0.878; thus the level of short interest is quite stable. This result indicates that 
sidelined investors are present and may potentially influence share prices. 
In order to examine the sidelined investor hypothesis more closely, we sort our stocks into terciles by 
institutional ownership and report in Table 4 the abnormal returns surrounding the quarter of 
disagreement. Institutional ownership is inversely related to constraints on short-selling (Boehmer and 
Kelley (2009), and Zhao et al. (2006)), so a low level of institutional ownership is expected to at first yield 
“optimistic prices,” according to Miller (1977), followed by negative abnormal returns. This should be 
especially true in the case of a high level of disagreement, both according to Miller (1977) and the 
empirical findings of Boehmer et al. (2006). Instead, we find that the contemporaneous abnormal 
returns in our low-ownership, high-shorting-constraints tercile (H1) are lower than those in our high-
ownership, low-constraints tercile (H3) for cases of disagreement among institutions. 
Table 4  
Disagreement, short-sales constraints, and stock returns 
  Qtr 0 Qtr 1 M + 1 M + 2 M + 3 
Panel A: Abnormal return when institutions disagree sorted on short-sales constraints (IH 
based)  
H1 (highest constraints) 
0.004 
(0.992) 
0.549 
(0.272) 
0.984 
(0.000) 
−0.093 
(0.620) 
−0.216 
(0.287) 
H2 (medium constraints) 
0.334 
(0113) 
0.250 
(0.245) 
0.334 
(0.745) 
0.109 
(0.276) 
0.142 
(0.167) 
H3 (lowest constraints) 1.159 0.171 −0.161 0.090 0.286 
  Qtr 0 Qtr 1 M + 1 M + 2 M + 3 
(0.000) (0.399) (0.202) (0.453) (0.021) 
H1–H3 
−1.155 
(0.020) 
0.378 
(0.482) 
1.145 
(<0.001) 
−0.184 
(0.408) 
−0.503 
(0.034) 
Panel B: Abnormal return when institutions disagree sorted on short-sales constraints (IVOL 
based)  
IVOL 1 (highest constraints) 
0.270 
(0.633) 
−0.084 
(0.870) 
0.622 
(0.012) 
−0.180 
(0.339) 
−0.384 
(0.064) 
IVOL 2 (medium constraints) 
0.756 
(0.001) 
0.570 
(0.007) 
0.164 
(0.130) 
0.188 
(0.188) 
0.213 
(0.213) 
IVOL3 (lowest constraints) 
0.418 
(0 .070) 
0.485 
(0.011) 
0.069 
(0.514) 
0.097 
(0.361) 
0.385 
(<0.001) 
IVOL1–IVOL3 
−0.150 
(0.807) 
−0.570 
(0.299) 
0.553 
(0.041) 
−0.277 
(0.200) 
−0.769 
(0.000) 
This table examines the abnormal returns, within different classes of short-sales constraints, for 
the cases when investors are in disagreement. In Panel A, short-sales constraints in each stock 
are proxied by the aggregate level of holding by all institutional investors for a particular quarter 
as reported in the Thomson 13-F files. In Panel B, short-sales constraints in each stock are 
proxied by idiosyncratic volatility calculated using Fama–Fench 3 factor as detailed in the text. 
We examine the abnormal returns for the group of stocks with the highest level of disagreement 
among institutional investors sorted by short-sales constraints. To identify the group of stocks 
with the highest level of disagreement, stocks are sorted in three groups each quarter on the basis 
of institutional ratio as detailed in the text. The stocks with the lowest value of institutional ratio 
are categorized as the stocks with the highest level of disagreement among institutional investors. 
We compute the cross-sectional mean of abnormal returns for each group of stocks in each 
quarter and then take the time-series average for the entire time period. All abnormal returns are 
based on the Carhart 4-factor model. Qtr 0 is the quarter in which disagreement occurs. Returns 
are the cumulative abnormal returns for the 3 months of the contemporaneous quarter 0 and the 
abnormal returns for the first 3 months afterward: M1, M2, and M3. To compute the monthly 
abnormal return of the stocks, excess stock returns are regressed on the excess market, size, 
book-to-market, and momentum factors. We download excess market return, size, book-to-
market, and momentum factors from Kenneth French’s website. The abnormal return (in  %) in 
each month is the sum of the monthly residual and intercept from our regressions. P values based 
on two-tailed t tests are shown in parentheses 
Furthermore, abnormal returns in both the subsequent month and subsequent quarter are opposite 
to what is predicted by the sidelined investor hypothesis, both in absolute terms and relative to 
the abnormal returns of those firms that are the least constrained. 
In order to check the robustness of these results, we use idiosyncratic volatility as an alternate proxy for 
short-sales constraints, consistent with prior literature, in Panel B. To compute idiosyncratic volatility 
(IVOL) during month t, we regress the daily excess return of each stock I on the contemporaneous daily 
Fama and French (1993) factors as follows: 
ri,d−rf,d=αi+βi(rm,d−rf,d)+γi(smbd)+δi(hmld)+εi,d, 
where ri,d − rf,d is the daily excess return of stock i over the 1-month T-bill yield on day d; rm,d − rf,d, 
denotes the daily excess return of the value-weighted return on all NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks 
over the 1-month T-bill yield on day d; smbd, is the difference between the respective returns of small 
and large capitalization stocks on day d; and hmld, is the difference between the respective returns of 
high and low book-to-market stocks on day d. 
The monthly idiosyncratic volatility of stock i in month t is defined as the standard deviation of the 
residuals from this regression multiplied by the square root of the number of trading days in the month: 
IVOLi,t=var(ei,d)−−−−−−−√×Dt−−√, 
In the equation above, D t is the number of trading days for stock i in month t. The results reported in 
Panel B of Table 4, which are based on sorting the sample into terciles on idiosyncratic volatility, are 
similar to those in Panel A. Thus, we find no evidence in Table 4 to support the sidelined investor 
hypothesis that shorting constraints cause “optimistic prices” and a subsequent correction. 
3.4 Separating the effect of information asymmetry from that of shorting constraints 
Throughout this paper, we use institutional ownership as the primary proxy for short-selling 
constraint and firm size for information asymmetry. However, there could be some interaction 
between these variables—for example, institutional ownership increases with firm size, 
suggesting that the most constrained firms, which have the lowest institutional ownership, also 
tend to have the highest degree of information asymmetry, i.e., the smallest capitalization. Such 
interaction imposes a challenge to judge the merits of the “information asymmetry hypothesis” 
and the “sidelined investor hypothesis” with respect to one another. Additionally, because these 
two hypotheses yield opposite empirical predictions on the influence of disagreement on asset 
prices, it is also difficult to judge how they compare to that of the “unbiased prices hypothesis”. 
Thus far, the initial results based on our full sample appear to lend support to the unbiased prices 
hypothesis. However, when we sort the full sample by firm size and by institutional ownership, 
respectively, we find support for the information asymmetry hypothesis and no support for the 
sidelined investor hypothesis. Hence, it is important to note that our initial results do not 
unambiguously support the unbiased prices hypothesis of Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) and 
Hong and Stein (2003). It could be the case that both the sidelined investor and information 
asymmetry hypotheses have merit but their opposite effects on stock returns cancel out one 
another in the initial results, thus giving the misleading appearance of evidence in favor of the 
unbiased prices hypothesis. In the following sections, we perform more direct tests that intend to 
disentangle the sidelined investor hypothesis from the information asymmetry hypothesis. Our 
further analysis may also offer conclusive findings regarding the validity of the unbiased prices 
hypothesis in explaining the impact of disagreement on asset prices. 
We begin by further examining the abnormal returns reported in Tables 3 and 4 through the prism of an 
independent sort.6 First, we group our high-disagreement sample into terciles based on institutional 
ownership, and then separately into terciles based on market capitalization. This independent sort 
results in nine (three-by-three) groups of sample stock-quarters. We then report in Table 5 the abnormal 
returns of the four groups covering the bottom (“S1”) and top (“S3”) size terciles interacting with the 
bottom (“H1”) and top (“H3”) institutional ownership terciles. 
Table 5  
Disagreement, short-sales constraints, firm size and stock returns 
  Panel A (most constrained; H1) Panel B (least constrained; H3) 
Qtr 0 Qtr 1 M + 1 M + 2 M + 3 Qtr 0 Qtr 1 M + 1 M + 2 M + 3 
Abnormal return when institutions disagree sorted on short-sales constraints  
S1 (smallest 
firms) 
−2.315 
(0.000) 
1.088 
(0.150) 
1.795 
(0.000) 
0.082 
(0.771) 
−0.545 
(0.060) 
−7.232 
(0.000) 
−0.137 
(0.823) 
0.610 
(0.077) 
−0.155 
(0.616) 
−0.442 
(0.145) 
S3 (largest 
firms) 
4.296 
(0.000) 
−0.429 
(0.125) 
−0.184 
(0.239) 
−0.289 
(0.079) 
0.046 
(0.775) 
2.249 
(0.000) 
0.390 
(0.060) 
−0.106 
(0.390) 
0.194 
(0.065) 
0.323 
(0.007) 
S1–S3 
−6.612 
(0.000) 
1.518 
(0.059) 
1.979 
(0.000) 
0.371 
(0.255) 
−0.592 
(0.074) 
−9.948 
(0.000) 
−0.528 
(0.415) 
0.716 
(0.050) 
−0.349 
(0.285) 
−0.765 
(0.019) 
  Panel C (smallest firms; S1) Panel D (largest firms; S3) 
Qtr 0 Qtr 1 M + 1 M + 2 M + 3 Qtr 0 Qtr 1 M + 1 M + 2 M + 3 
Abnormal return when institutions disagree sorted on firm size  
H1 (most 
constrained) 
−2.315 
(0.000) 
1.088 
(0.150) 
1.795 
(0.000) 
0.082 
(0.771) 
−0.545 
(0.060) 
4.296 
(0.000) 
−0.429 
(0.125) 
−0.184 
(0.239) 
−0.289 
(0.079) 
0.046 
(0.775) 
H3 (least 
constrained) 
−7.232 
(0.000) 
−0.137 
(0.823) 
0.610 
(0.077) 
−0.155 
(0.616) 
−0.442 
(0.145) 
2.249 
(0.000) 
0.390 
(0.060) 
−0.106 
(0.390) 
0.194 
(0.065) 
0.323 
(0.007) 
H1–H3 
4.916 
(0.000) 
1.226 
(0.208) 
1.185 
(0.024) 
0.237 
(0.571) 
−0.1036 
(0.804) 
2.047 
(0.001) 
−0.820 
(0.018) 
−0.078 
(0.696) 
−0.483 
(0.013) 
−0.277 
(0.171) 
This table examines the abnormal returns when investors are in disagreement sorted 
independently by short-sales constraints and by firm size. Firm size is proxied by natural 
logarithm of market capitalization computed as the share price at the start of the quarter 
multiplied by the shares outstanding, extracted from the CRSP monthly files. Short-sales 
constraints in each stock are proxied by the aggregate level of holding by all institutional 
investors for a particular quarter as reported in the Thomson 13-F files. We examine the 
abnormal returns for the group of stocks with the highest level of disagreement among 
institutional investors sorted by short-sales constraints and firm size independently. To identify 
the group of stocks with the highest level of disagreement, stocks are sorted in three groups each 
quarter on the basis of institutional ratio as detailed in the text. The stocks with the lowest value 
of institutional ratio are categorized as the stocks with the highest level of disagreement among 
institutional investors. We compute the cross-sectional mean of abnormal returns for each group 
of stocks in each quarter and then take the time-series average for the entire time period. All 
abnormal returns are based on the Carhart 4-factor model. Qtr 0 is the quarter in which 
disagreement occurs. Returns are cumulative abnormal returns for the 3 months of the 
contemporaneous quarter 0 and abnormal returns for the first 3 months afterward: M1, M2, and 
M3. In order to compute the monthly abnormal return of the stocks, excess stock returns are 
regressed on the excess market, size, book-to-market, and momentum factors. We download 
excess market return, size, book-to-market, and momentum factors from Kenneth French’s 
website. The abnormal return (in  %) in each month is the sum of the monthly residual and 
intercept from our regressions. P values based on two-tailed t tests are shown in parentheses 
Panel B presents results for the subset of stocks that are the least shorting-constrained (highest 
level of institutional ownership, “H3”). Therefore, the abnormal returns of the smallest size 
tercile (“S1”) are the most likely to be affected by the presence of asymmetric information. 
Hence, the “S1” section of Panel B represents a favorable scenario for testing the information 
asymmetry hypothesis, which predicts low abnormal returns in the contemporaneous quarter 
followed by high abnormal returns in subsequent months. We find a highly significant average 
abnormal return of −7.23 % in the quarter of disagreement and a relatively small (but marginally 
significant) reversal of 0.61 % in the subsequent month. Moreover, the difference in the 
abnormal returns of −9.95 % between the smallest and largest firms in Panel B (the row titled 
“S1–S3”) also supports the information asymmetry hypothesis, although the first month’s 
reversal of 0.72 % is again relatively small despite its statistical significance. 
Panel D provides us with the results of a fairly direct test of the sidelined investor hypothesis, 
since the firms therein are large (“S3”) and thus unlikely to have significant information 
asymmetry. As the sidelined investor hypothesis predicts, the most shorting-constrained firms 
(“H1”) experience initially high abnormal returns of 4.30 % in the quarter of disagreement and 
then a reversal, which is though small and marginally significant only for a one-sided test, in the 
following quarter. However, the difference between the abnormal returns to the bottom and top 
institutional ownership terciles (shown in the row labeled “H1–H3”) constitutes further evidence 
in favor of the sidelined investor hypothesis. The most constrained firms display significantly 
higher contemporaneous-quarter and lower subsequent-quarter abnormal returns than the less-
constrained firms of the largest firms within the subsample. Thus, in each case where we use one 
subsample of companies that are less likely to be affected by one hypothesis in order to test the 
other hypothesis, we find supportive evidence for the hypothesis being examined. 
Although Panels B and D of Table 5 provide results for the most direct tests of the information 
asymmetry and sidelined investor hypotheses, respectively, the results reported in Panels A and 
C provide further insight on the roles of these two hypotheses in explaining the effect of investor 
disagreement on stock returns. Panel A features highly shorting-constrained stocks (“H1”), i.e., 
those with the lowest level of institutional ownership. Similar to the results reported in Panel B, 
we find support for the information asymmetry hypothesis when we compare the abnormal 
returns for the top (“S3”) versus bottom (“S1”) size terciles. The abnormal returns that we 
observe both for firms with limited shorting constraints (“H3”) and for firms with a high level of 
shorting constraints (“H1”) are consistent with the predictions of the information asymmetry 
hypothesis. This suggests that our results are robust to differences in shorting constraints. 
Additionally, the negative contemporaneous quarter’s abnormal return for highly shorting-
constrained stocks reported in Panel A is smaller in magnitude than that for less constrained 
stocks reported in Panel B. This suggests that the sidelined investor hypothesis partially offsets 
the information asymmetry hypothesis with regard to stock returns in cases of disagreement. 
Panel C of Table 5 reports the abnormal returns for the tercile of firms experiencing the most 
information asymmetry (“S1”). When we examine the abnormal return differentials between the 
institutional ownership terciles (the row labeled “H1–H3”), we find higher, though negative, 
abnormal returns for the most shorting-constrained firms than for the least constrained firms. 
However, we find no evidence of a relative reversal in the following month or quarter. The 
positive abnormal return differential between the institutional ownership terciles reported in 
Panel C supports the sidelined investor hypothesis among firms with the most information 
asymmetry and suggests that our results are robust to differences in the degree of asymmetry. In 
addition, the negative abnormal returns to even the most shorting-constrained firms (“H1”) in 
Panel C suggest that both hypotheses may be at work simultaneously within this subset of our 
sample and that the information asymmetry hypothesis at times dominates the sidelined investor 
hypothesis. This sheds new light on the results in Table 4, which initially did not appear to 
support the predictions of the sidelined investor hypothesis. 
Overall, we interpret the results in Table 5 as supportive of both the information asymmetry and 
sidelined investor hypotheses. Further, we find evidence that the effects of the two forces are in 
some cases offsetting one another, which helps considerably to explain the results from our 
earlier tables. Thus, we conclude that the initial appearance of support for the unbiased prices 
hypothesis—and the appearance of a lack of support for either the information asymmetry or the 
sidelined investor hypothesis—is not sustained upon further investigation. 
Though there is evidence that the information asymmetry hypothesis may have the upper hand in 
explaining the effect of investor disagreement on stock returns, both hypotheses do, in fact, 
appear to wield significant influence. Hence, care must be taken in disentangling their 
confounding effects. 
4 Conclusion 
In this study we create a new measure of disagreement based on institutional trades in order to 
examine how the divergence of opinion among investors affects stock returns. We use the 
imbalance of stock-level buying and selling as a percentage of institutional trading to measure 
agreement (low values imply greater disagreement). Three hypotheses regarding the effect of 
disagreement on stock returns currently exist: the sidelined investor hypothesis, which predicts 
high initial and low subsequent abnormal returns; the information asymmetry hypothesis, which 
predicts low initial and high subsequent abnormal returns; and the unbiased prices hypothesis, 
which predicts that abnormal returns concurrent with and subsequent to periods of investor 
disagreement will on average be insignificant. 
Our initial results, taken from the full sample, show little if any support for the information 
asymmetry hypothesis or the sidelined investor hypothesis. Thus at first blush the results appear 
consistent with the unbiased prices hypothesis. However, after sorting our sample by firm size, 
we find that for the smallest firms, disagreement among institutions does correspond to negative 
returns initially and an almost exact reversal in the following month as predicted by the 
information asymmetry hypothesis. When we sort our sample by institutional ownership as a 
proxy for shorting constraints and examine cases of disagreement, we find no evidence of 
positive initial returns followed by a reversal as predicted by the sidelined investor hypothesis. 
Additionally, when we employ alternative proxies for information asymmetry and shorting 
constraints, the results enumerated above remain largely unchanged. 
Although these findings appear to reject the sidelined investor hypothesis and are supportive of 
the information asymmetry hypothesis, we cannot draw such a conclusion for two reasons. First, 
there can be interaction between the variables used to measure information asymmetry and 
shorting constraints. Second, the first two hypotheses make opposite predictions regarding the 
impact on stock returns of disagreement between investors. Thus it may be the case that both of 
the first two hypotheses are correct, but the opposing pressures on stock returns tend to offset 
one another, making the sidelined investor hypothesis appear not to be present when it may in 
fact be. Further analysis reveals that the companies that are likely to suffer from either—but not 
both—shorting constraints or information asymmetry do experience abnormal returns that are 
consistent with the predictions of the information asymmetry and sidelined investor hypotheses. 
We thus conclude that the weight of the evidence presented in this study supports these two 
hypotheses even though at first it appears otherwise. 
 
Footnotes 
1. 1. 
Chen and Guo (2010) apply a version of Miller (1977) model in IPO settings to study 
many IPO related patterns. 
2. 2. 
For the purposes of this paper, it is immaterial if the number of buyers is greater than the 
number of sellers or vice versa. This is because we are concerned about the difference in 
opinion among traders rather than their actual preferences with respect to buying or 
selling. In addition, the use of absolute values aids the analysis in the next section. 
3. 3. 
We agree with the argument that stronger belief in a private signal will manifest itself in 
more buying or selling by an institution. Thus, the number of shares bought or sold may 
provide additional information. We believe our simpler measure performs as well and has 
the additional benefit that it helps us focus on the more fundamental issue of 
disagreement by removing the effect of greater dollar holdings by an institution. 
4. 4. 
We also used a more liberal 10 % increase to proxy for seasoned equity offerings. This 
does not materially affect our results. 
5. 5. 
Additionally, we reproduced Tables 2, 3, 4, 5 and included the abnormal returns for 
months 4, 5, and 6 as well as months 1, 2, and 3. The results remained unchanged. For the 
sake of brevity we do not report the results for months 4, 5 and 6 in this paper. 
6. 6. 
We also conducted various dependent sorts on firm size and institutional ownership. The 
results we obtained were very similar to those of the two independent sorts reported in 
Table 5. 
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